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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS SOUNDNESS:  A CAMELS STUDY OF NIGERIAN PRE AND POST CONSOLIDATION ERA  LUCKY ANYIKE LUCKY   and   Henry WaleruAkani, Department of Banking and Finance, Rivers State University  Nkpolu - Port Harcourt, Rivers State,Nigeria  ABSTRACT This study examined CAMELS analysis of Nigerian quoted commercial banks from 1997– 2016 pre and post consolidation. The objective was  to x-ray and compare the Nigerian banking system soundness in the pre and post consolidation using the CAMELS criteria. Time series data of the variables were sourced from financial statements of the quoted deposit money banks within the period. The study used Capital to Risk Assets Ratio (CRA) and Adjusted Capital to Risk Assets (ACRA) as Capital Adequacy (C), Non Performing Loans and Advances to Total Assets (TLA/TA) as Assets Quality (A), Operating Expenses to Total Assets (OPE/TA), Total loans and Advances to Total Deposit (TLA/TD) as Management Quality (M), Net Interest Income to Total Assets (NII/TA) as Earnings (E), Total Liquid Assets to Total Assets (L) as liquidity (TLA/TA) and Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (S) (TLA/GDP) as sensitivity. Simple average and ranking was used as data analysis method. Findings revealed that the performance of the commercial banks in the post consolidation is better than the pre-consolidation. The study concludes that there is a significant difference between the pre and post consolidation of the quoted commercial banks using the CAMELS criteria. It recommends that the banking sector reforms should be strengthened deepened and the capital and management of the commercial banks should be used for effective to achieve the objective of the banking sector reforms. KEYWORDS: Capital Adequacy, Assets Quality, Management Quality, Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity, Consolidation   I. INTRODUCTION Over the years, there is no doubt saying, Nigeria banking industry has undergone various phases of reforms both in structure, policies, rules and regulations with the objective of achieving sound banking system and financial system stability. The regulatory and the supervisory policy framework are aimed at achieving prudential and financial system stability. The banking sector consolidation and recapitalization reforms programme of 2005 has been noted in the history of the Nigerian Banking sector as the most proactive measure to ensure sound banking system and leverage the industry of the inability to withstand monetary and macroeconomic shocks within the operating environment. The reforms was designed to enable the banking system develop the require resilience as the fulcrum of financial intermediation (Lemo, 2005).  CAMELS area acronyms for Capital Adequacy, Assets Quality, Management Quality, Earnings Capacity, Liquidity and Sensitivity to risks operations in the operating environment is a product of the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) adopted by the Financial Institutions Examination Council (FIEC) and was first used in United State in 1979 (Nimalathasan, 2008). It is a ratio-based model to evaluate the performance of banks and rank the banks according to the rating criteria. The regulatory authorities’ argued that bank supervisor uses the CAMELS to access and evaluate the performance and financial soundness of the banking activities and provide a measurement of a bank current, overall financial, managerial, operational and compliance performance (Sanni, 2009).  In light of the Nigerian Banking sector crisis in the last forty years, CAMELS is a useful tool to examine the safety and soundness of banks and help mitigate the potential risks which may lead to bank failures (Ajaro and Emmanuel, 2013). The consolidation reforms Nigeria in 2005 mandated Commercial banks to adhered strictly to the norms of capital adequacy, assets quality, provision for  non- performing loans, prudential management and corporate governance, disclosure requirements, acceleration of pace and reach of latest technology, effective risk management mechanism, streamlining the procedures and complying with accounting standards by making financial transparent (Kolade, 2012). The uncertainties that characterize the bank operating environment, the frequent banking sector crisis and its effect on the  financial market as well as the ideas of low CAMELS rating model relates to other similar model like stress test is relevant in the modern banking environment (Gunsel,2007),CAMELS rating ranges from 1 – 5.CAMELS’ model reflect excellently the conditions and performance of banks over years as well as enriches 
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the on-site and off-site examination to bring better assessments toward banks conditions. Mohammed (2009) claims that the strength of these factors would determine the overall strength of the bank. The quality of each component further underlines the inner strength and how far it can take care of itself against the market risk. Providing a general framework in evaluating overall performance of banks is of great importance due to the increasing integration of banking and the financial market notwithstanding, however, the Nigerian Banking Industry has undergone various stages of reforms which include the pre and the post consolidation era.  The  consolidation of Nigerian banking sector was a welcome development; however, there has been two schools of thought on the consolidation, the prominent believe that the consolidation will increase banks operational efficiency, deepened the bank capital standard, leverage the challenges of the operating environment such as risk and position Nigerian banks to international standard (Subroto, 2011), (Aburime,2008) (Inanga,2009). Prior to the consolidation no Nigerian bank was among the first 500 in Africa and the first 1000 in the world using the CAMELS rating. The total assets and liabilities of Nigerian banks were less than one bank in Malaysia and South Africa (Toby, 2006). Thus, opponent view the consolidation as a measure to create monopoly in the banking industry that will deepen the banking sector crises. In less than five years after the consolidation, some Nigerian banks were found “ill” functioning by the Central Bank of Nigeria Examination team in 2009 which led to Nationalization of eight banks and the establishment of Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON). The banks are Mainstreet bank, Keystone bank. The divergences between the two schools of thought create a knowledge gap in using the CAMELS in examining the soundness of the banking industry.  Again, Despite the long application of CAMELS in examining and rating of Banks in the developed financial markets, the application in the developing financial market like Nigeria is still at rudimentary stage as studies to examine the soundness of Nigerian banks focused on profitability indicators such as Return on Assets, Return on Investment, Return on Equity, Net Profit Margin and Earnings per share (Aburime, 2008), (Nnana, 2008), (Prasad, 2011). Similar study by Sanni (2013) using CAMELS does not include sensitivity to risk which is relevant in ascertain banks ability to withstand both internal and external shocks. From the above, this study intends to examine Nigerian Banking System soundness of the pre and post consolidation using the CAMELS Analysis of quoted commercial banks in Nigeria.     2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview of Camels Analysis  The Uniform Financial Institution Rating system, commonly referred to as CAMELS rating, was adopted by the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council on November 13 1979, and then adopted by the National Credit Union Administration in October 1987. It has proven to be an effective internal supervisory tool for evaluating the soundness of a financial firm, on the basis of identifying those institutions requiring special attention or concern Barr et al. (2002) states that “CAMELS rating has become a concise and indispensable tool for examiners and regulators”. This rating ensures a bank’s healthy conditions by reviewing different aspects of a bank based on variety of information sources such as financial statement, funding sources, macroeconomic data, budget and cash flow.  
Hirtle and Lopez (1999), stressed that the bank’s CAMELS rating is highly confidential, and only exposed to the bank’s senior management for the purpose of projecting the business strategies, and to appropriate supervisory staff. Its rating is never made publicly, even on a lagged basis. CAMELS is an acronym for six components of bank safety and soundness 
Capital Adequacy (C) Capital adequacy is a measure of the financial strength of a bank usually express as a ratio of its shareholders‟ fund to total assets. The ratio reflects the ability of a bank to withstand the unanticipated losses. This ratio has a positive relationship with the financial soundness of the bank. This means that if the bank’s capital adequacy ratio is high, the bank will be financially sound and strong. 
Asset Quality (A) Asset quality is an important measure of the strength of banks. The ratio of non-performing loans and advances as a share of total loans and advances is considered for the purpose of analysis. In addition, the ratio of total loans and advances to total assets is utilized to measure the extent of deployment of assets in earning assets.  
Management Quality (M) The capacity and or the efficiency of the management of a bank can be measured with the help of certain ratios. To capture the possible dynamics of management efficiency, the following ratios 
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are considered: total loans and advances to total deposits, interest expenses to total deposits, and operating expenses to total assets. 
Earnings Ability (E) Two ratios are used to assess the earnings ability of the banks under study. The first ratio is the net income to total assets or “Return on Asset (ROA). The second ratio used is interest income to total assets. The two ratios have positive relationship with the financial performance of the bank and negative relationship with the risk of bank failure.  
Liquidity (L) Two ratios are employed in this study to assess the liquidity level of the banks. The first one is total liquid assets to total assets. The second ratio is liquid assets to customers‟ deposits. The two ratios have positive or negative impact on the financial performance of the firm. 
Sensitivity to the Market Risk (S): This measures the extent to which bank operation are sensitivity to its operating environment such as monetary and macroeconomic environment. The ratios are: 
1. Earnings per share to interest rate 
2. Return on investment to Real Gross Domestic Product. 
3. Return on Asset to Exchange Rate 
4.  Return on Equity to Equity Price. 
 Banking in Nigeria and the Banking Sector Consolidation  Between 1892 when banking started in Nigeria and 1952 when the legal framework for it was laid out, banking was largely an unregulated activity in Nigeria. Since 1952, there has been significant growth in size and structure of banks. Financial liberalization led to a loosening of the conditions for granting banking license and consequently a sharp rise occurred in the number of banks in Nigeria between 1986 and 1993. By 1992, there were over 120 banks with 3,300 branches up from 15 banks with 273 branches in 1970. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)stipulation that banks should have branches in major cities with Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) branches as a condition for direct cheque clearance led to a growth in branch expansion rate of 33.5 percent between 2001 and 2003. Banking distress reduced the number to 89 by 2004 (with 26 banks collapsing in 1998 alone). The majority of banks were fragmented, small and marginal players with only about 10 of the banks controlling over 50 percent of total industry assets and deposits (Sanusi, 2003).   As at mid-2004 when the new Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)Governor was appointed, the industry faced myriad challenges including operating within a slow and structurally impeded system, frequent changes of policies about operations and government deposit management, periodic distress, weak credit regulation, poor management, poor corporate governance, macroeconomic shocks and political instability, unethietical practices,  maturity mismatches, insider abuses, frauds and conflict of interest, general insecurity and corruption. Prior to this time, cultural and business model rigidities resulted to voluntary mergers and Acquisition in 1991 and 2001. Following the announcement for all banks to raise their capital base, the apex bank set up a monitoring committee to oversee the program. However, it did not seem to have a monopoly and/or competition monitoring process or commission. It brought in, and paid for technical assistance to the banks; with most of such assistance contained of payments for merger and acquisition experts. It also worked with the Securities and Exchange Commission to drastically reduce and in many cases, remove fees payable to the commission for such mergers and acquisitions. While banks handled software, operations and branch mergers, the apex bank allowed for a transition time for operations merger and regularization of employees for merged banks beyond the consolidation deadline. There was also special assistance that took the form of a special forbearance framework, which took effect on 6 April 2005. The special assistance had two components, one of which is a write-off of 80 percent of debt owed Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)by the banks, subject to:  Recovery of non-performing owner/insider related loans and advances within two months. Injection of any shortfall in the banks’ capitalization to bring it up to a solvency status, also within two months;The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)converted the balance of 20 percent of debt to a long term loan of maximum of 7 years at 3 percent per annum with two years moratorium. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also announced that further 
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forbearance on the balance of 20 percent of the debt could be extended to the new owners after its acquisition and meeting the N25 billion capital base. The idea was to increase attractiveness of the banks concerned and accelerate their mergers and acquisitions through debt write-off. Fortunately, the incentives were contingent upon recovery of nonperforming loans associated with owners and other insiders of the banks (Olajide, 2005). This way, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) wanted to ensure that past mismanagement of banks were not rewarded. In its 2005 accounts, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) provided for these incentives by treating the loans to the affected banks as sunk and irrecoverable costs. The provision for the incentives to be contingent upon insider loan recovery led to only 11 banks actually benefiting from the incentive provision. Besides, it started midway in to the consolidation program and this may have impacted on the number of banks that benefited ultimately.   According to Ahamd (2007) the average bank had a capital base of N4.22 billion Naira with standard deviation of 7.46 billion Naira, ranging from 0.1 billion Naira to 38.6 billion Naira. The average shareholders’ fund was estimated to be N1, 350.77 million, with a standard deviation of 519.57 Million Naira. In terms of loans, loans to SMEs was 7.65 percent total loans with a standard deviation of 2.55 while loans for agricultural purposes was estimated at an average of N223,553.20 million with a standard deviation of 17,147.86 million Naira. Finally, an average bank had 27.84 percent of their total loans as nonperforming prior to consolidation, with a standard deviation of 10.22 percent. The proportion of nonperforming loans ranged between 6.5 percent for one bank and almost half of total loans (46.55%) for another of prior consolidation era.  There were three outcomes observed among the 89 banks post-consolidation. These banks were generally classified into three groups, reflecting the post-consolidation outcome. A majority of the banks either formed voluntary mergers or were forced into mergers to survive the conciliation rules. In all, 70 banks fall into this category, representing 78.65% of the total (89) banks. In addition, there were 6 banks which stood alone post consolidation, representing 6.74% of the total (89) banks. The remaining 13 banks (representing 14.61 percent of the 89 banks) failed after the consolidation exercise according to Central Bank of Nigeria, (2006).      Camels Rating System A bank’s composite rating under Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) or CAMELS integrate  \ratings from six component areas: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. Evaluations of the component areas take into consideration the institution’s size and sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk profile. Composite and component ratings range from 1 to 5. A 1 is the highest rating and represents the least supervisory concern, indicating the strongest performance and risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. A5 is the lowest rating and represents the greatest supervisory concern, indicating the most critically deficient level of performance and inadequate risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile.  Capital Ratings 1  A rating of 1 indicates a strong capital level relative to the institution’s risk profile. 2  A rating of 2 indicates a satisfactory capital level relative to the financial institution’s risk profile. 3 A rating of 3 indicates a less than satisfactory level of capital that does not fully support the institution’s risk profile. The rating indicates a need for improvement, even if the institution’s capital level exceeds minimum regulatory and statutory requirements. 4  A rating of 4 indicates a deficient level of capital. In light of the institution’s risk profile, viability of the institution may be threatened. Assistance from shareholders or other external sources of financial support may be required. 5  A rating of 5 indicates a critically deficient level of capital such that the institution’s viability is threatened. Immediate assistance from shareholders or other external sources of financial support is required.  Asset Quality The asset quality rating reflects the quantity of existing and potential credit risk associated with the loan and investment portfolios, other real estate owned, and other assets, as well as off-balance sheet transactions. The ability of management to identify, measure, monitor, and control credit risk is reflected and evaluation of asset quality should consider the adequacy of the allowance for loan lease losses and weight the exposure to 
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counterparty, issuer, or borrower default under actual or implied contractual agreements. All other risks that may affect the value or marketability of an institution’s assets, including, but not limited to, operating, market, reputation, strategic, or compliance risks, should also be considered. The asset quality of a financial institution is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:  The adequacy of underwriting standards, soundness of credit administration practices, and appropriateness of risk identification practices. 
 The level, distribution, severity, and trend of problem, classified, nonaccrual, restructured, delinquent, and nonperforming assets for both on- and off-balance sheet transactions. 
 The adequacy of the allowance for loan and lease losses and other asset valuation reserves. 
 The credit risk arising from or reduced by off-balance sheet transactions, such as unfunded commitments, credit derivatives, commercial and standby letters of credit, and lines of credit. 
 The diversification and quality of the loan and investment portfolios. 
  The extent of securities underwriting activities and exposure to counterparties in trading activities. 
 The existence of asset concentrations. 
 The adequacy of loan and investment policies, procedures, and practices. 
 The ability of management to properly administer its assets, including the timely identification and collection of problem assets. 
 The adequacy of internal controls and management information systems. 
 The volume and nature of credit documentation exceptions. 
 Asset Quality Ratings 1  A rating of 1 indicates strong asset quality and credit administration practices. Identified weaknesses are minor in nature and risk exposure is modest in relation to capital protection and management’s abilities. Asset quality in such institutions is of minimal supervisory concern. 2 A rating of 2 indicates satisfactory asset quality and credit administration practices. The level and severity of classifications and other weaknesses warrant a limited level of supervisory attention. Risk exposure is commensurate with capital protection and management’s abilities. 3  A rating of 3 is assigned when asset quality or credit administration practices are less than satisfactory. Trends may be stable or indicate deterioration in asset quality or an increase in risk exposure. The level and severity of classified assets, other weaknesses, and risks require an elevated level of supervisory concern. There is generally a need to improve credit administration and risk management practices. Comptroller’s Handbook 49 Bank Supervision Process 4  A rating of 4 is assigned to financial institutions with deficient asset quality or credit administration practices. The levels of risk and problem assets are significant, and inadequately controlled, and they subject the financial institution to potential losses that, if left unchecked, may threaten its viability. 5  A rating of 5 represents critically deficient asset quality or credit administration practices that present an imminent threat to the institution’s viability.  Management The capability of the board of directors and management, in their respective roles, to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of an institution’s activities and to ensure that a financial institution’s safe, sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and regulations is reflected in this rating. Generally, directors need not be actively involved in day-to-day operations; however, they must provide clear guidance regarding acceptable risk exposure levels and ensure that appropriate policies, procedures, and practices have been established. Senior management is responsible for developing and implementing policies, procedures, and practices that translate the board’s goals, objectives, and risk limits into prudent operating standards. Depending on the nature and scope of an institution’s activities, management practices may need to address some or all of the following risks: credit, market, operating or transaction, reputation, strategic, compliance, 
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legal, liquidity, and other risks. Sound management practices are demonstrated by: active oversight by the board of directors and management; competent personnel; adequate policies, processes, and controls taking into consideration the size and sophistication of the institution; maintenance of an appropriate audits program and internal control environment; and effective risk monitoring and management information systems. This rating should reflect the board’s and management’s ability as it applies to all aspects of banking operations as well as other financial service activities in which the institution is involved. The capability and performance of management and the board of directors is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:  The level and quality of oversight and support of all institution activities by the board of directors and management. 
 The ability of the board of directors and management, in their respective roles, to plan for, and respond to, risks that may arise from changing business conditions or the initiation of new activities or products. 
 The adequacy of, and conformance with, appropriate internal policies and controls addressing the operations and risks of significant activities. 
 The accuracy, timeliness, and effectiveness of management information and risk monitoring systems appropriate for the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. Comptroller’s Handbook 50 Bank Supervision Process. The adequacy of audits and internal controls to: promote effective operations and reliable financial and regulatory reporting; safeguard assets; and ensure compliance with laws, regulations, and internal policies. 
 Compliance with laws and regulations. 
 Responsiveness to recommendations from auditors and supervisory authorities. 
 Management depth and succession.  
 The extent that the board of directors and management is affected by, or susceptible to, dominant influence or concentration of authority. 
 Reasonableness of compensation policies and avoidance of self-dealing. 
 Demonstrated willingness to serve the legitimate banking needs of the community. 
 The overall performance of the institution and its risk profile. 
Management Ratings 1  A rating of 1 indicates strong performance by management and the board of directors and strong risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. All significant risks are consistently and effectively identified, measured, monitored, and controlled. Management and the board have demonstrated the ability to promptly and successfully address existing and potential problems and risks. 2  A rating of 2 indicates satisfactory management and board performance and risk management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. Minor weaknesses may exist, but are not material to the safety and soundness of the institution and are being addressed. In general, significant risks and problems are effectively identified, measured, monitored, and controlled. 3 A rating of 3 indicates management and board performance that need improvement or risk management practices that are less than satisfactory given the nature of the institution’s activities. The capabilities of management or the board of directors may be insufficient for the type, size, or condition of the institution. Problems and significant risks may be inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled. A rating of 4 indicates deficient management and board performance or risk management practices that are inadequate considering the nature of an institution’s activities. The level of problems and risk exposure is excessive. Problems and significant risks are inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled and require immediate action by the board and management to preserve the soundness of the institution. Replacing or strengthening management or the board may be necessary. A rating of 5 indicates critically deficient management and board performance or risk management practices. Management and the board of directors have not demonstrated the ability to correct problems and implement 
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appropriate risk management practices. Problems and significant risks are inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled and now threaten the continued viability of the institution. Replacing or strengthening management or the board of directors is necessary.   Earnings This rating reflects not only the quantity and trend of earnings, but also factors that may affect the sustainability or quality of earnings. The quantity as well as the quality of earnings can be affected by excessive or inadequately managed credit risk that may result in loan losses and require additions to the allowance for loan and lease losses, or by high levels of market risk that may unduly expose an institution’s earnings to volatility in interest rates. The quality of earnings may also be diminished by undue reliance on extraordinary gains, nonrecurring events, or favorable tax effects. Future earnings may be adversely affected by an inability to forecast or control funding and operating expenses, improperly executed or ill advised business strategies, or poorly managed or uncontrolled exposure to other risks. The rating of an institution’s earnings is based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:  The level of earnings, including trends and stability. 
 The ability to provide for adequate capital through retained earnings. 
 The quality and sources of earnings. 
 The level of expenses in relation to operations. 
 The adequacy of the budgeting systems, forecasting processes, and management information systems in general. 
 The adequacy of provisions to maintain the allowance for loan and lease losses and other valuation allowance accounts. 
 The earnings exposure to market risk, such as interest rate, foreign exchange, and price risks. 
 Earnings Ratings A rating of 1 indicates earnings that are strong. Earnings are more than sufficient to support operations and maintain adequate capital and allowance levels after consideration is given to asset quality, growth, and other factors affecting the quality, quantity, and trend of earnings. A rating of 2 indicates earnings that are satisfactory. Earnings are sufficient to support operations and maintain adequate capital and allowance levels after consideration is given to asset quality, growth, and other factors affecting the quality, quantity, and trend of earnings. Earnings that are relatively static, or even experiencing a slight decline, may receive a 2 rating provided the institution’s level of earnings is adequate in view of the assessment factors listed above. A rating of 3 indicates earnings that need to be improved. Earnings may not fully support operations and provide for the accretion of capital and allowance levels in relation to the institution’s overall condition, growth, and other factors affecting the quality, quantity, and trend of earnings. Rating of 4 indicates earnings that are deficient. Earnings are insufficient to support operations and maintain appropriate capital and allowance levels. Institutions so rated may be characterized by erratic fluctuations in net income or net interest margin, the development of significant negative trends, nominal or unsustainable earnings, intermittent losses, or a substantive drop in earnings from the previous years. A rating of 5 indicates earnings that are critically deficient. A financial institution with earnings rated 5 is experiencing losses that represent a distinct threat to its viability through the erosion of capital.  Liquidity In evaluating the adequacy of a financial institution’s liquidity position, consideration should be given to the current level and prospective sources of liquidity compared to funding needs, as well as to the adequacy of funds management practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. In general, funds management practices should ensure that an institution is able to maintain a level of liquidity sufficient to meet its financial obligations in a timely manner and to fulfill the legitimate banking needs of its community. Practices should reflect the ability of the institution to manage unplanned changes in funding sources, as well as react to changes in market conditions that affect the ability to quickly liquidate assets with minimal loss. In addition, funds management practices should ensure that liquidity is not maintained at a high cost, or through undue 
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reliance on funding sources that may not be available in times of financial stress or adverse changes in market conditions. Liquidity is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors: The adequacy of liquidity sources to meet present and future needs and the ability of the institution to meet liquidity needs without adversely affecting its operations or condition.  The availability of assets readily convertible to cash without undue loss. 
 Access to money markets and other sources of funding. 
 The level of diversification of funding sources, both on- and off-balance sheet. 
 The degree of reliance on short-term, volatile sources of funds, including borrowings and brokered deposits, to fund longer term assets. 
 The trend and stability of deposits. 
 The ability to securitize and sell certain pools of assets. 
 The capability of management to properly identify, measure, monitor, and control the institution’s liquidity position, including the effectiveness of funds management strategies, liquidity policies, management information systems, and contingency funding plans. 
 Liquidity Ratings A rating of 1 indicates strong liquidity levels and well-developed funds management practices. The institution has reliable access to sufficient sources of funds on favorable terms to meet present and anticipated liquidity needs. A rating of 2 indicates satisfactory liquidity levels and funds management practices. The institution has access to sufficient sources of funds on acceptable terms to meet present and anticipated liquidity needs. Modest weaknesses may be evident in funds management practices. A rating of 3 indicates liquidity levels or funds management practices in need of improvement. Institutions rated 3 may lack ready access to funds on reasonable terms or may evidence significant weaknesses in funds management practices. A rating of 4 indicates deficient liquidity levels or inadequate funds management practices. Institutions rated 4 may not have or be able to obtain a sufficient volume of funds on reasonable terms to meet liquidity needs. A rating of 5 indicates liquidity levels or funds management practices so critically deficient that the continued viability of the institution is threatened. Institutions rated 5 require immediate external financial assistance to meet maturing obligations or other liquidity needs.  Sensitivity to Market Risk The sensitivity to market risk component reflects the degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, or equity prices can adversely affect a financial institution’s earnings or economic capital. When evaluating this component, consideration should be given to: management’s ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control market risk; the institution’s size; the nature and complexity of its activities; and the adequacy of its capital and earnings in relation to its level of market risk exposure.  Market risk is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:  The sensitivity of the financial institution’s earnings or the economic value of its capital to adverse changes in interest rates, foreign exchanges rates, commodity prices, or equity prices. 
 The ability of management to identify, measure, monitor, and control exposure to market risk given the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. 
 The nature and complexity of interest rate risk exposure arising from non-trading positions. 
 Capital adequacy  
 Asset quality  
 Management quality  
 Earning ability  
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 Liquidity 
 Sensitivity  
Capital Adequacy  Fundamentals of Capital Adequacy  Capital adequacy is the capital expected to maintain balance with the risks exposure of the financial institution such as credit risk, market risk and operational risk, in order to absorb the potential losses and protect the financial institution‘s debt holder. “Meeting statutory minimum capital requirement is the key factor in deciding the capital adequacy, and maintaining an adequate level of capital is a critical element” (The United States. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 1997).  Karlyn (1984) defines the capital adequacy in term of capital-deposit ratio because the primary risk is depository risk derived from the sudden and considerably large scale of deposit withdrawals. In 1930, FDIC created a new capital model as capital-asset ratios since the default on loans came to expose the greatest risk instead of deposit withdrawals. To gauge the capital adequacy, bank supervisors currently use the capital-risk asset ratio. The adequacy of capital is examined based upon the two most important measures such as Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) or Capital to Risk-weighted Assets ratio, and the ratio of capital to assets.   Interpret what are the capital requirements and which banks meet them; what banks are privatizing or merging; are requirements different for private and state banks. (1) Actual capital adequacy ratio is above regulatory minimum  
(2) Good ability to raise capital through government injection or private/public issues  Capital Adequacy Ratios  Each of components in the CAMELS model is scored from 1 to 5. In the context of capital adequacy, a rating of 1 indicates a strong capital level relative to the financial institution’s risk. Meanwhile, the rating of 5 indicates a critical deficient level of capital, in which immediate assistance from shareholders or external resources is required.   Asset quality  Fundamentals of asset quality  According to Grier (2007), “poor asset quality is the major cause of most bank failures”. A most important asset category is the loan portfolio; the greatest risk facing the bank is the risk of loan losses derived from the delinquent loans. The credit analyst should carry out the asset quality assessment by performing the credit risk management and evaluating the quality of loan portfolio using trend analysis and peer comparison. Measuring the asset quality is difficult because it is mostly derived from the analyst’s subjectivity.  Frost (2004) stresses that the asset quality indicators highlight the use of non-performing loans ratios (NPLs) which are the proxy of asset quality, and the allowance or provision to loan losses reserve. As defined in usual classification system, loans include five categories: standard, special mention, substandard, doubtful and loss. NPLs are regarded as the three lowest categories which are past due or for which interest has not been paid for international norm of 90 days. In some countries regulators allow a longer period, typically 180 days. The bank is regulated to back up the bad debts by providing adequate provisions to the loan loss reserve2 account. The allowance for loan loss to total loans and the provision for loan loss to total loans should also be taken into account to estimate thoroughly the quality of loan portfolio.   The asset quality requirements are taken into AIA’s CAMEL approach to  Trends should be noted such as loan concentrations, intra-group lending, and real-estate exposure. For a bank which heavily exposes to lend some specific business sectors and/or business entities, lack of diversification will make its loan portfolio vulnerable. Therefore, AIA designs the portfolio mix shared equally by a third of each of consumer, commercial and industrial loans.   
Loan growth: has there been a large increase in loan growth and in what type of lending; are prudent standards being followed or are they becoming lax due to competition.  
Non-performing loans: amount, composition, causes for large increase or decreases, how NPLs are defined.  
Reserves: levels of reserves in relation to total loans and non-performing loans.  
Real-estate exposure: what percentage of loans are real estate based and what type of real estate lending-commercial or residential.  
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Intra-group exposure: what level of lending is to affiliated companies; what is the group‘s primary businesses; what is the level of ownership.  The asset quality is estimated based upon the following key financial ratios and to be considered as good banks, they must meet certain criteria detailed below:  Rating of Asset Quality. Each of the components in the CAMEL rating system is scored from 1 to 5. In the context of asset quality, a rating of 1 indicates a strong asset quality and minimal portfolio risks. On the other hand, a rating of 5 reflects a critically deficient asset quality that presents an imminent threat to the institution’s viability.  Management quality  Fundamentals of management quality  Management quality is basically the capability of the board of directors and management, to identify, measure, and control the risks of an institution‘s activities and to ensure the safe, sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 1997).  Grier (2007) suggests that management is considered to be the single most important element in the CAMELS rating system because it plays a substantial role in a bank’s success; however, it is subject to measure as the asset quality examination.  AIA approach to bank analysis states that the management has clear strategies and goals in directing the bank’s domestic and international business, and monitors the collection of financial ratios consistent with management strategies. The top management with good quality and experience has preferably excellent reputation in the local communication. The management requirements are taken into AIA’s CAMELS approach to Bank Analysis (1996) as below:  Ownership: the bank is majority-owned by the government because government support is the most important mitigating factor to potential financial problems, or by large Private Corporation that have economic significance.  
Size: top local ranking in term of assets.  
Year of operations: long operation history since establishment.   Rating of Management  Each of components in the CAMELS rating system is scored from 1 to 5. In the context of management, a rating of 1 is assigned to note the management and board of directors are fully effective. On the other hand, the rating of 5 is applicable to critically deficient management. Replacing or strengthening may be needed to achieve sound and safe operations.   Earning ability  Fundamentals of earning ability  This rating reflects not only the quantity and trend in earning, but also the factors that may affect the sustainability of earnings. Inadequate management may result in loan losses and in return require higher loan allowance or pose high level of market risks. The future performance in earning should be given equal or greater value than past and present performance.  In accordance with Grier (2007)’s opinion, a consistent profit not only builds the public confidence in the bank but absorbs loan losses and provides sufficient provisions. It is also necessary for a balanced financial structure and helps provide shareholder reward. Thus consistently healthy earnings are essential to the sustainability of banking institutions. Profitability ratios measure the ability of a company to generate profits from revenue and assets.   The profitability is estimated based upon the following key financial ratios, and to be considered as good banks, they must meet certain criteria detailed below: Rating of Earning Ability  Each of the components in the CAMELS rating system is scored from 1 to 5. In the context of earning, a rating of 1 reflects strong earnings that are sufficient to maintain adequate capital and loan allowance, and support operations. On the other hand, a rating of 5 experiences consistent losses and represents a distinct threat to the institution’s solvency through the erosion of capital.   Liquidity  Fundamentals of liquidity 24  
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There should be adequacy of liquidity sources compared to present and future needs, and availability of assets readily convertible to cask without undue loss. The fund management practices should ensure an institution is able to maintain a level of liquidity sufficient to meet its financial obligations in a timely manner; and capable of quickly liquidating assets with minimal loss.  Rudolf (2009) emphasizes that “the liquidity expresses the degree to which a bank is capable of fulfilling its respective obligations”. Banks makes money by mobilizing short-term deposits at lower interest rate, and lending or investing these funds in long-term at higher rates, so it is hazardous for banks mismatching their lending interest rate.  The liquidity requirements are taken into AIA’s CAMELS approach to Bank Analysis (1996) as below:  (1) Majority of the funding is coming from customer’s deposits, and no concentration of funding sources.  
(2) Maturity or interest rate mismatch  
(3) Central bank imposes reserve requirements   The profitability is estimated based upon the following key financial ratios, and to be considered as good banks, they must meet certain criteria detailed below: Rating of Liquidity  Each of the components in the CAMELS rating system is scored from 1 to 5. In the context of liquidity, a rating of 1 represents strong liquidity levels and well-developed funds as the institution has access to sufficient sources of funds to meet present and anticipated liquidity needs. On the other hand, the rating of 5 signifies critical liquidity-deficiency, and the institution demands immediate external assistance to meet liquidity needs.   SENSITIVITY Banks operate in a diverse environment which has direct effect on the operation of the bank. It affects the earnings ability and the operational efficiency of the industry. Monetary and macro economic shocks for instance have direct bearing on the performance of the banks. Quantitatively, sensitivity can be measure as follows:   Money supply to bank total asset  Money supply to lending rate  GNP to Total deposit   GDP to Total bank investment  Interest rate risk   Table I: Position of Nigeria Banks after the Consolidation S/N GROUP MERGING PARTNERS SHARE HOLDERS FUND 
TOTAL ASSET TOTAL DEPOSIT 
1 First bank First Bank Plc and MBC International Bank Plc 44.67bn 377.49bn 265.67bn 2 Diamond bank First Merchant Bank Diamond Bank and lion Bank 28.6bn N/a W/A 3 Platinum Habib Platinum bank and Habib bank 25bn 116bn 60.6bn 4 Zenith bank Plc Zenith bank Plc (alone) 38bn 370.72bn 233bn 5 Oceanic bank Oceanic bank & Int’l Trust  bank 31.1bn 217.8bn 167.4bn 6 International bank Intercontinental bank, Equity, Global and Gateway bank. N51bn 350bn 220bn  7 Fidelity bank Fidelity bank, FSB Int’l and many bank 29bn 120bn N/A 8 First city Monument bank (FCMB) 
FCMB, cooperative Development bank, and Nig. American Merchant bank 28bn 90bn 50bn 
9 United bank for Africa (UBA) UBA, and Standard trust bank 50bn 419.3bn 318.4bn 10. Spring bank Citizens bank Int’l, ACB, Omega, Trans Int’l bank & Guardian Express 27bn 90bn 60bn 11. Access bank Access bank, marina Int’l and Capital bank 28bn 140bn 60bn 12. NIB Nigeria Int’l bank (alone) N/A N/A N/A 13. Sterling bank Trust bank of Africa, Magnum Trust bank, NBM bank, NAL bank, and Indo-Nigeria 25bn 100bn 60bn 
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bank 14 Unity bank Intercity Bank, First Interstate, Tropical Commercial Bank, Center Point And Pacific Bank, Societe Bancaire, NNB Int’l, New African and bank of the North 
30bn 100bn N/A 
15 ETB/DEVCOM Equitorial Trust Bank and Devcom bank 26.5bn 56bn 34.14bn 16 Eco bank Eco bank (alone) N/A N/A N/A 17 Union bank Union bank, union merchant, broad bank, universal trust bank 39.12bn 396.3bn 200bn 18 STANBIC BANK Stanbic (Nig) Bank (alone) N/A N/A N/A 19 First inland bank First Atlantic, inland, IMB Int’l and NUB bank 30bn 130bn 80bn 20 Guaranty Trust Guaranty Trust Bank (alone) 30.88bn 167.9bn 95.65bn 21 Standard Chartered Standard Chartered bank (alone)  26bn 34.72bn 23.5bn 22 Afribank Afribank Plc, Afribank (Merchant Bankers) international Assurance and lead bank  Over 25bn 110bn 62bn 23 IBTC bank Investment Banking and Trust Company Plc (IBTC), Chartered bank Plc and Regent Bank 
38bn Over100bn N/A 
24 Skye bank Prudent bank, EIB Int’l bank Bond bank, and Cooperative bank 37.7bn Over  100bn 70bn 25 Wema bank Wema bank, National Bank 35bn 127.7bn 78bn Source:      Financial Standard Newspaper,Jan.4TH,2006.  Empirical Review Cabral et al. (2002) Carletti et al. (2002) and Szapary (2001) provided the foundation for a research on the linkage between banks mergers and acquisitions and profitability. Evidence as provided by Calomiris and Karenski (1996) De-Nicolo (2003)  and Caprion (1999) suggested that mergers and acquisitions in the financial system could impact positively on the efficiency of most banks. Surprisingly, the available empirical evidence suggests that mergers and acquisitions operations in the United States banking industry have not had a positive influence on performance in term of efficiency.  DeLong and Deyoung (2007) overall of these studies provide mixed evidence and many fail to show a clear relationship between mergers and acquisitions and performance.  Some of the previous literature has examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions operation on cost efficiency as measured by simple accounting cost ratios (DeYoung, 2007), the impact on cost x-efficiency. Also, evidence supporting mergers and acquisitions to achieve cost saving and efficiency gain is sparse (Kwan and Elsenbeis, 1999). Akhavein et al. (1997) analysed changes in profitability experienced in the same set of large mergers as examined by Berger and Humphrey (1992). They found that banking organizations significantly improved their profit efficiency ranking after mergers.   De Young (1993) does find that when both the acquirer and target were poor performers, mergers Okpanachi 2003 resulted in improved cost efficiency. Healy et al. (1992) examined all commercial banks and bank holding company mergers and acquisitions occurring between 1982 and 1986. They found that mergers and acquisitions did not reduce non-interest expenses that could have lead to improved efficiency. Pilloff and Santomero (1997), there is little empirical evidence of mergers achieving growth or other important performance gains. Their findings undermine a major rationale for mergers and consequently raised doubt other benefits mergers and acquisitions may provide to businesses.  Cornett and Tehranian (1992) and Kay (1993) find some evidence of superior post merger period because of the merged firms’ enhanced ability to attract loans. They also show increased employee productivity and net asset growth. Also, this is evident in the Nigeria’s banking industry (Okpanachi, 2006). Walter and Uche (2005) posited that mergers and acquisitions made Nigerian banks more efficient. They used table to present their data which was analyzed using simple percentage. Akpan (2007), using square to test this stated hypothesis found that the policy of consolidation and capitalization has ensured customers’ confidence in the Nigerian banking industry in term of high profit. Sobowale (2004) and Osho (2004), it is expected that the value of the companies that participated in mergers and acquisitions activities would be higher than before because future dividends and earning streams are expected to rise and subsequently improves efficiency. Uchendu (2005) and Kama (2007) 
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opined that, the bank consolidation which took place in Malaysia facilitated banks expansion which led to growth. Kwan (2002) found that the high rate of economic activities experienced in Chile was mainly from productivity’s improvement from the large banks formed as a result of mergers and acquisitions. Berger and Mester (1997) and Stiroh (2002) using data on United States banks suggested that, there may be some substantial scale efficiency from larger sizes of banks as a result of mergers and acquisitions. But for Straub (2007), mergers and acquisitions have often failed to add significantly to the performance of banking sector.  The majority of studies comparing pre and post mergers performance found that, this potential efficiency derived from mergers and acquisitions rarely materialize (Piloff, 1996; Berger et al., 1999). Beitel et al. (2003) found no gain effect due to mergers and acquisitions.Yener and David (2004), mergers and acquisitions played an important role in improving after merger financial performance which is a stimulus for efficiency. Most of the studies examined found that mergers and acquisitions add significantly to the profits of the banking sector, except for Straub (2007) and Rhoades (1993) that have contrary views. Onaolapo (2008) employed CAMEL rating system to examine the effectiveness of recapitalization. He found that recapitalization had improved the financial health of banks.   Sani (2004) using a regression model, Sani discovered a positive and significant relationship between recapitalization policy and economic growth in Nigeria. Adegbaju (2008) examined the effectiveness of recapitalization on the performances of 20 Nigerian banks. He discovered that while few banks recorded appreciable improvements in their performances, majority of the banks remained the same or even worse off. Okafor (2009) research on consolidation exercise in Nigeria employed capital adequacy asset quality liquidity and management. 2004 -2005 was regarded as the pre consolidation period while 2006-2009 was regarded as the post consolidation period, she concluded that consolidation improved the overall performance of banks in terms of assets size, deposit base, capital base and capital adequacy , however it did not contribute to the profit efficiency of those commercial banks. Using the dynamic panel GMM method on a cross sectional data from 2000 -2010, Barnos and Caporale(2008) came to a conclusion that consolidation specifically reduced foreign ownership of commercial banks and also through merger and acquisition banks were more cost efficient.   The investigation carried out by Elumilade (2010) on the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the efficiency of financial intermediation in the Nigerian banking industry had evidence that the consolidation programme induced mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry and improved competitiveness and efficiency of the borrowing and lending operations of the Nigerian banking industry. Olaosebikan (2009) investigated the efficiency of the Nigerian banking system between 1999 and 2005. Bank efficiency was evaluated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The results indicated that efficiency fluctuated during the first part of the period and improved during the recent years, a period associated with the increase in minimum capital requirement, differences in banks’ efficiency was explained by problematic loans and their size.   Donwa and Odia (2011) investigated the impact of the consolidation on banking industry in the Nigerian Capital Market between 2004 and 2008 using primary (questionnaires) and secondary data from the Nigerian Stock Exchange. When the data was analyzed with the chi-square test and ANOVA, it was found that bank consolidation affected the industry significantly as most of the banks had to go to the capital market to raise the required amount by issuing securities. They submitted that banks’ consolidation had increased public awareness and operations of the Nigerian capital market just as the capital market had continued to be an easy and cheap source of funds for banks in the post consolidation era. Based on their findings, it was recommended that the banks and capital market regulatory authorities should continue to monitor and institute reforms program that would better reposition the banking industry as a major player in the Nigerian Capital Market and the economy. Adegboyega (2012) evaluated the impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance of Banks in Nigeria. Pre-merger and post merger financial statements of two consolidated banks were obtained, adjusted, carefully analyzed and compared. The result revealed that all the two groups produced in addition to operational and relational synergy, financial gains far more than the 2+2=5 synergistic effects. Ratio technique and inferential statistical tools were used to highlight synergistic effects on the merging banks. Berger and Udell (1995) used 1980-1988 as its study scope and the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) method. The study found out that deregulation of deposit rates caused an increase in average cost in US banks especially the smaller ones, hence it led to reduced efficiency while during post deregulation periods, and their average coast fell owing to the structural change.  0Sobodu and Akiode (1995) employed data envelopment analysis (DEA) to study the efficiencies of banking institutions in Nigeria under the privatization policy, the study showed that the efficiency of the Nigerian banking system declined significantly during period of financial deregulation compared to its levels before 
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consolidation, they also discovered that privately owned banks operated more efficiently than government owned banks. Favero and Papi (1995) used a sample consisting of 174 Italian banks, which represented 80 percent of total deposits, cross-sectional data from 1991 to 1995 and used the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as its methodology. The major findings showed that efficiency of banks was mainly determined by productivity and specialization by bank size and lesser by their locations.   Erel (2006) studied the effect of bank mergers on loans price. He found out that on average mergers reduced loan spreads, and that the results were stronger for acquirers with large declines in operating cost post merger. According to him, merger and acquisitions did not decrease the spread of the loans, because, by the time one or more banks were merged together at least they would be stronger more than before and that would allow them to spread credits to borrowers more than before. Lamberte and Manlagnit (2004) examined the recent consolidation trends among depository institutions (commercial banks and thrifts) in Philippine for the period between 1989 and 1994. The study found out that market concentration increased significantly, midsize commercial banks were gaining market share at the expense of large banks in most markets. Roger and Ferguson (2009) studied the financial consolidation. Their study concluded with an extensive evaluation of the potential effects of financial consolidation on the efficiency of financial institutions, competition among such firms, and credit flows to households and small businesses.   According to Willson, Wilson and Goddard (2008) consolidation in the US had empirical evidence that there was often little improvement in efficiency or performance of merged entity. The study also suggested that the hubris and agency motives for merger may be relevant, or that synergy derived more from enhanced market power than from cost savings De young (1993) studied 348 merged banks, of which 43 percent were intercompany ones. The study estimated pre- and post-merger cost efficiency by applying a thick frontier approach. Prior to merger, the acquiring banks were more cost efficient than the target; however, in the three years period after the merger, cost efficiency improved in about 64 percent of the cases.   3. Research Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to compare Nigerian Commercial Banks soundness in the pre and post consolidation.The nature of this research is such that secondary data will be used. The secondary data was sourced from the financial statement commercial banks in Nigeria and Central Bank of Nigeria financial review for the period. The pre consolidation period covers 1997-2003 while the post consolidation covers 2009-2016, 2004 and 2005 were skipped to examine the effect on the consolidation.  4. Results and Discussion This section of the study contains the time series data of the invariable that makes up CAMELS. This study adopts the CAMELS approach to evaluate the performance of the 15 quoted commercial banks in the pre and post consolidation period the pre-consolidations is 8 years from 1997-2004 while the post consolidation is 8 years from 2009- 2016. Capital Adequacy (C) Capital adequacy is a financial strength of a bank according to Adesina (2012), it is usually expressed as its shareholders fund to total asset. In this study, capital asset to risk asset and adjusted capital to risk asset is used.   Table II - V analyze the capital adequacy of the fifteen (15) quoted banks in the pre and post consolidation.     
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Table II:  Capital – Risk Assets Ratio (Pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Average Rank Access bank  25.2 20.2 24.1 24.7 26.4 39.8 11.45 11.39 183.24 22.91 7 
Eco bank  14.3 23.7 14.1 12.8 17.1 16.5 20.6 18.6 137.70 17.21 13 Diamond bank  26.2 17.8 11.0 17.5 13.4 29.6 18.0 19.5 153.00 19.13 12 FCMB bank 21.3 19.7 14.6 18.1 12.0 18.2 16.7 13.5 134.10 16.76 15 Fidelity bank 81.9 78.1 88.4 10.26 10.64 54.7 57.3 57.1 438.40 54.80 1 First bank  18.6 18.1 14.4 14.8 14.3 13.1 15.5 13.9 122.70 15.34 14 GT bank  35.1 25.6 18.1 14.2 24.8 27.5 20.8 18.2 184.30 23.04 5 Skye bank 26.5 36.7 31.1 31.0 23.2 19.6 27.5 39.4 235.00 29.38 4 Sterling bank 14.1 16.3 14.1 26.4 14.9 24.9 20.4 26.8 157.90 19.74 11 Stanbic bank  19.4 19.8 24.5 26.6 24.7 24.2 26.6 15.4 181.20 22.65 8 UBA bank  35.0 29.3 52.7 28.5 21.1 20.7 30.1 24.4 241.80 30.23 3 Union bank 24.1 21.3 24.7 29.3 34.4 12.7 10.7 11.3 168.50 21.06 10 Unity bank  27.4 26.7 34.4 23.6 62.1 68.7 38.0 34.9 315.80 39.48 2 Wema bank 29.6 10.1 26.6 28.5 17.7 12.6 27.8 27.4 180.30 22.54 9 Zenith bank  21.1 23.3 25.2 25.8 24.1 22.5 24.4 17.4 183.8 22.97 6 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.    Table III:  Capital – Risk Assets Ratio (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank  Access bank  96.1 47.7 68.5 21.2 23.5 26.2 23.3 30.0 336.50 42.06 2 Ecobank 21.5 18.6 16.0 13.2 11.7 16.2 18.3 17.5 133.00 16.63 8 Diamond bank  18.7 10.3 21.1 11.5 18.1 11.8 19.4 13.2 124.10 15.51 10 Fcmb bank 16.2 18.4 10.7 13.5 15.6 18.7 14.8 12.3 120.20 15.03 11 Fidelity bank 27.1 60.9 96.1 31.9 33.5 75.0 93.3 13.37 431.17 53.90 1 Firstbank 10.9 12.5 13.0 30.9 31.2 34.3 34.7 45.8 213.30 26.66 7 GTbank 13.0 09.1 12.8 13.7 11.6 14.8 16.1 19.4 110.50 13.81 12 Skye bank 24.0 23.8 28.1 24.6 28.4 34.8 31.8 33.0 228.50 28.56 5 Sterling bank 19.4 11.3 05.3 03.9 12.1 07.6 13.8 07.4 80.80 10.10 14 Stanbic bank  01.2 07.1 04.6 03.6 17.1 04.7 08.1 08.2 54.60 6.83 15 UBA bank  12.2 10.4 14.9 76.1 13.37 35.5 66.3 86.7 315.47 39.43 3 Union bank 12.7 11.7 30.5 35.3 35.7 26.0 37.9 35.5 225.30 28.16 6 Unity bank  47.7 18.8 08.1 07.6 15.8 90.5 25.5 16.1 230.10 28.76 4 Wema bank 12.3 08.2 06.4 04.5 13.4 14.4 13.9 14.7 87.80 10.98 13 Zenith bank  10.5 14.5 26.6 27.3 26.3 01.8 13.9 08.4 129.30 16.16 9 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.       
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Table IV: Adjusted Capital to Risk Assets (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Average Rank Access bank  27.4 26.8 27.1 32.7 30.3 30.6 35.1 25.1 235 29.39 8 Ecobank 16.1 16.6 29.2 30.4 24.9 29.1 17.8 17.4 182 22.69 12 Diamond bank  20.0 14.9 20.4 16.3 17.1 20.3 18.1 17.5 145 18.08 14 Fcmb bank 13.9 18.9 16.0 22.5 13.1 17.6 18.8 14.8 136 16.95 15 Fidelity bank 44.1 49.9 51.4 28.9 13.9 12.5 20.8 28.0 250 31.19 6 Firstbank 50.6 16.2 23.2 25.7 21.9 56.8 60.0 51.0 305 38.18 2 GTbank 22.3 24.0 25.4 24.7 21.8 28.5 29.8 27.9 204 25.55 11 Skye bank 36.1 35.6 36.2 41.3 25.7 41.3 30.0 20.5 267 33.34 4 Sterling bank 28.3 35.0 27.4 23.5 47.3 26.5 28.9 29.7 247 30.83 7 Stanbic bank  13.0 13.5 22.7 21.9 22.7 29.5 38.2 50.7 212 26.53 10 UBA bank  17.5 59.7 65.1 74.9 16.4 22.9 25.9 25.6 308 38.50 1 Union bank 36.3 42.6 38.0 41.1 33.0 14.2 39.9 31.8 277 34.61 3 Unity bank  42.6 48.3 34.5 38.0 20.4 22.0 28.7 16.4 251 31.36 5 Wema bank 14.9 27.7 25.3 24.8 10.7 16.3 14.1 31.7 166 20.69 13 Zenith bank  35.6 14.3 19.3 24.3 28.5 39.3 31.8 39.2 232 29.04 9 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  Table V: Adjusted Capital to Risk Assets (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank Access bank  24.0 23.5 28.3 11.5 42.5 28.9 19.7 14.4 193 24.10 9 Ecobank 20.9 27.5 25.2 15.5 12.5 13.7 15.7 27.5 159 19.81 12 Diamond bank  17.3 25.4 23.8 15.1 18.4 17.0 10.1 10.9 138 17.25 15 Fcmb bank 18.2 16.5 18.7 14.3 16.8 16.3 24.8 24.3 150 18.74 14 Fidelity bank 24.9 22.8 42.6 24.5 35.5 41.9 45.0 44.6 282 35.23 2 Firstbank 38.3 10.1 16.7 19.9 16.0 10.2 12.2 38.8 162 20.28 11 GTbank 11.6 15.5 20.1 30.0 21.1 28.4 46.8 47.0 221 27.56 8 Skye bank 28.9 40.2 29.9 21.5 30.3 26.6 28.0 32.1 238 29.69 7 Sterling bank 10.6 36.2 49.6 36.6 23.0 38.0 38.2 45.5 278 34.71 3 Stanbic bank  21.9 31.7 43.2 66.0 44.8 37.9 36.5 35.8 318 39.73 1 UBA bank  19.0 22.0 50.8 30.6 26.9 47.4 30.1 45.6 272 34.05 5 Union bank 40.1 15.5 38.5 39.1 15.7 44.9 42.2 43.2 279 34.90 4 Unity bank  28.5 37.9 34.7 45.0 34.7 21.5 33.2 26.8 262 32.79 6 Wema bank 11.5 13.6 14.4 15.2 28.9 23.3 27.7 20.5 155 19.39 13 Zenith bank  10.3 28.6 11.3 14.4 20.9 26.8 35.5 24.2 172 21.50 10 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Capital-Risk Assets Comparative analysis of the components of capital adequacy during the pre-consolidation era shows that Fidelity Bank has a higher capital-risk assets ratio and first Bank having the lowest capita-risk assets ratio while the post-consolidation also had Fidelity Bank with the highest capital risk asset ratio and Sterling Bank has the lowest capital-risk ratio. 
The pre-consolidation adjusted capital to Risk Asset depicted a high figure for United Bank for Africa while Wema Bank shows an average of 20.69% with Rank 13 while post consolidation adjusted capital to risk assets shows a high amount of 39.73 for Sterling Bank and a low amount of 17.25 for Diamond Bank and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively. 
Asset Quality (A)  Asset quality is a measure of strength of the bank. In this study, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans and advance and advances to total assets is used. Table 5 – Table 8 below gives analysis of asset quality of the commercial banks in pre and post consolidations.  
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Table VI: Non- Performing loans to total loans and advances   (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total  Average Rank Access bank  24.7 26.8 28.5 23.1 24.4 20.3 21.6 19.4 189 23.60 6 Ecobank 25.0 22.6 36.1 26.6 37.2 57.1 48.3 29.8 283 35.34 3 Diamond bank  10.5 18.1 13.7 15.3 19.3 20.7 14.7 17.0 129 16.16 14 Fcmb bank 18.7 17.6 12.6 19.5 21.1 14.7 18.2 19.0 141 17.68 13 Fidelity bank 40.7 63.0 88.3 63.0 25.2 71.4 89.1 47.2 488 60.99 1 Firstbank 18.4 20.4 19.8 18.3 19.6 17.6 27.7 20.8 163 20.33 9 GTbank 30.2 24.1 27.6 26.6 31.7 30.0 18.7 29.3 218 27.28 4 Skye bank 25.2 20.2 17.3 29.9 19.4 21.7 20.7 18.4 173 21.60 8 Sterling bank 11.8 12.9 19.8 11.8 16.7 18.9 14.0 11.3 117 14.65 15 Stanbic bank  24.9 21.7 21.4 14.9 17.4 14.3 15.3 17.5 147 18.43 10 UBA bank  14.0 19.5 11.1 35.5 45.1 82.8 32.4 45.9 286 35.79 2 Union bank 15.0 10.8 19.0 12.7 11.3 34.0 18.0 28.0 149 18.60 11 Unity bank  18.8 12.8 16.9 28.3 29.1 24.9 20.6 24.1 176 21.94 7 Wema bank 22.8 17.8 29.0 12.6 16.7 10.6 15.6 19.7 145 18.10 12 Zenith bank  27.5 26.1 32.5 31.6 36.2 38.0 13.0 10.8 216 26.96 5 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  Table VII: Non- Performing loans to total loans and advances (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Average Rank Access bank  18.6 16.2 14.0 45.1 18.1 24.8 21.2 33.7 192 23.96 13 Ecobank 29.6 29.9 58.4 14.1 10.8 13.5 11.4 11.1 179 22.35 14 Diamond bank  20.4 16.4 85.2 54.2 19.6 25.1 31.9 19.4 272 34.03 3 Fcmb bank 21.0 72.1 16.3 49.0 18.1 20.1 26.4 16.5 240 29.94 8 Fidelity bank 93.6 21.5 23.8 68.1 86.8 58.0 45.9 10.9 409 51.08 1 Firstbank 21.5 33.0 68.1 59.1 15.0 13.9 14.7 15.6 241 30.11 7 GTbank 30.7 22.0 46.3 25.9 28.4 14.3 28.4 25.9 222 27.74 11 Skye bank 16.3 72.0 20.2 31.4 22.0 24.1 28.1 40.2 254 31.79 6 Sterling bank 22.1 82.0 28.0 51.4 21.8 15.9 24.4 17.5 263 32.89 5 Stanbic bank  31.1 35.1 78.0 19.6 16.1 13.7 19.9 18.2 232 28.96 9 UBA bank  18.1 74.0 39.3 40.0 43.7 45.8 61.8 75.6 398 49.79 2 Union bank 24.0 25.1 18.0 20.1 11.0 26.0 15.0 8.0 147 18.40 15 Unity bank  14.2 78.1 46.1 19.0 27.6 32.2 35.9 14.5 268 33.45 4 Wema bank 42.1 21.8 86.1 17.9 10.9 13.4 17.7 9.4 219 27.41 12 Zenith bank  69.1 43.1 19.0 22.0 12.0 11.0 33.0 15.2 224 28.05 10 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.     
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Table VIII: Total loans and advances to total asset (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Average Rank Access bank  13.9 19.1 20.2 24.1 25.8 23.0 28.1 32.2 186 23.30 8 Ecobank 26.6 22.0 13.7 18.5 15.3 46.1 46.1 19.3 208 25.95 4 Diamond bank  18.0 16.2 14.9 10.3 18.0 21.6 26.1 52.5 178 22.20 10 Fcmb bank 19.1 11.3 34.1 16.7 19.3 28.8 28.8 34.1 192 24.03 7 Fidelity bank 27.7 30.4 18.7 27.4 31.3 39.9 39.2 32.0 247 30.83 2 Firstbank 31.2 21.7 27.6 18.1 16.0 29.4 60.5 37.3 242 30.23 3 GTbank 20.3 23.5 22.8 21.3 29.1 26.9 29.2 23.1 196 24.53 5 Skye bank 20.6 20.0 13.6 27.5 21.6 18.3 26.3 19.8 168 20.96 12 Sterling bank 15.4 18.7 13.9 15.0 31.5 16.6 35.1 15.0 161 20.15 13 Stanbic bank  13.7 13.3 14.6 17.4 20.5 24.0 20.5 30.1 154 19.26 14 UBA bank  11.0 12.5 38.7 13.8 18.7 23.1 18.7 35,6 137 17.06 15 Union bank 29.6 30.9 27.5 21.7 43.7 45.9 43.7 31.2 274 34.28 1 Unity bank  25.2 24.0 11.0 13.8 15.0 30.1 50.1 17.1 186 23.29 9 Wema bank 39.2 30.3 9.6 24.4 16.7 31.1 16.7 26.1 194 24.26 6 Zenith bank  18.4 17.6 12.3 12.8 14.1 20.3 20.1 61.8 177 22.18 11 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  Table IX: Total loans and advances to total assets (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank Access bank  13.4 34.1 28.4 30.2 28.1 29.6 25.4 61.2 250 31.30 10 Ecobank 20.1 60.3 24.2 27.5 15.2 54.2 29.7 16.4 248 30.95 11 Diamond bank  27.1 57.1 30.2 26.3 18.0 55.1 18.0 59.1 291 36.36 7 Fcmb bank 20.0 37.1 18.1 18.7 21.0 23.1 17.1 24.0 179 22.39 15 Fidelity bank 36.2 39.5 48.7 40.1 26.2 33.1 33.2 62.3 319 39.91 5 Firstbank 48.0 23.1 31.1 17.1 18.4 21.3 30.5 57.4 247 30.86 12 GTbank 26.6 69.2 50.2 44.3 21.1 58.2 27.0 69.1 366 45.71 3 Skye bank 60.5 18.1 40.2 32.5 38.4 36.0 23.2 18.9 268 33.48 9 Sterling bank 39.0 30.0 48.2 12.1 24.2 19.9 67.2 27.8 268 33.55 8 Stanbic bank  38.1 39.6 49.3 62.4 48.9 44.2 48.0 47.7 378 47.28 2 UBA bank  56.3 46.1 47.3 19.5 58.4 7.0 50.5 31.1 316 39.53 6 Union bank 33.0 31.6 35.2 30.1 17.6 31.0 17.2 27.7 223 27.93 14 Unity bank  11.1 30.2 76.6 33.6 10.1 19.1 30.3 34.1 245 30.64 13 Wema bank 43.1 49.1 41.1 60.1 30.2 38.1 59.1 25.6 346 43.30 4 Zenith bank  26.3 24.1 43.2 64.2 89.1 46.3 65.1 30.1 388 48.55 1 Source:  Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Asset Quality Comparative analysis of the components of assets quality during the pre-consolidation era shows that Fidelity Bank has a higher non-performing loan to total loans and advances ratio and first Bank having the lowest non-performing loan to total loans and advances ratio while the post-consolidation also had Fidelity Bank with the highest non-performing loan to total loans and advances and Sterling Bank has the lowest non-performing loan to total loans and advances ratio. 
The pre-consolidation adjusted Total loans and advances to total assetsdepicted a high figure for Union Bank Plc while United Bank for Africa shows an average of 17.06% with Rank 15 while post consolidation Total loans and advances to total assets (post consolidation)shows a high amount of 48.55 for Zenith Bank and a low amount of 22.39 for FCMB and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively.  Management Quality (M) The capacity and efficiency of the bank can be measured with the help of certain ratios. In this study, operating expenses to total asset and loans and advance to total deposit is used. The tables below; table 9 – table 12 analyze management quality of the banks.  
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Table X: Operating expenses to total assets (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Average Rank Access bank  18.0 21.5 26.4 37.1 30.0 30.7 31.1 45.2 240 30.00 13 Ecobank 29.1 35.1 16.7 20.6 15.4 17.9 28.0 57.1 220 27.49 15 Diamond bank  63.1 19.0 16.3 17.9 17.4 16.5 21.8 52.0 224 28.00 14 Fcmb bank 57.6 19.5 60.4 16.0 17.8 30.0 25.0 39.1 265 33.18 9 Fidelity bank 40.8 39.9 43.1 47.2 64.8 32.2 49.5 22.8 340 42.54 1 Firstbank 15.3 42.8 44.0 58.1 16.1 51.1 47.0 49.5 324 40.49 6 GTbank 33.5 39.0 45.9 39.5 28.5 38.8 26.6 52.9 305 38.09 7 Skye bank 47.4 59.4 60.9 11.6 31.7 52.3 46.3 28.2 338 42.23 2 Sterling bank 19.5 28.4 49.5 32.0 10.8 43.0 21.0 38.9 243 30.39 12 Stanbic bank  69.0 41.1 24.1 20.2 42.2 60.1 48.8 22.1 328 40.95 5 UBA bank  68.1 15.8 48.3 35.1 41.8 58.1 25.0 45.3 338 42.19 3 Union bank 14.0 36.0 50.0 78.0 18.0 11.0 36.8 13.0 257 32.10 10 Unity bank  26.4 48.8 18.9 62.0 11.8 51.0 25.0 51.0 295 36.86 8 Wema bank 46.0 40.0 19.6 46.1 33.1 72.1 39.1 32.9 329 41.11 4 Zenith bank  33.0 39.4 66.0 16.1 18.0 27.0 18.0 40.0 258 32.19 11 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  Table XI: Operating expenses to total assets (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank Access bank  58.2 24.4 27.0 26.0 55.2 36.0 43.1 49.1 319 39.88 4 Ecobank 37.1 39.8 39.1 29.0 31.2 28.2 28.7 29.5 263 32.83 14 Diamond bank  19.3 72.1 44.1 34.1 43.1 31.1 29.1 24.6 298 37.19 9 Fcmb bank 18.7 56.8 64.1 21.1 46.1 41.4 19.7 23.1 291 36.38 10 Fidelity bank 39.1 59.4 29.2 23.2 23.3 39.2 42.4 49.3 305 38.14 7 Firstbank 23.1 38.1 17.6 62.1 16.8 47.1 35.1 32.1 272 34 11 GTbank 58.9 29.2 26.0 45.3 48.3 45.4 40.7 43.0 337 42.1 1 Skye bank 38.8 52.3 38.2 28.1 37.5 35.0 54.3 37.7 322 40.24 3 Sterling bank 48.0 71.0 37.0 38.2 21.8 47.1 16.1 21.1 300 37.54 8 Stanbic bank  32.1 19.0 41.0 31.1 51.0 39.8 34.8 61.5 310 38.79 6 UBA bank  41.2 42.0 28.6 66.7 38.0 27.2 49.8 29.0 323 40.31 2 Union bank 72.0 12.9 18.1 21.1 51.1 49.1 56.2 31.2 312 38.96 5 Unity bank  48.5 68.5 17.8 39.1 10.6 30.1 19.1 31.6 265 33.16 13 Wema bank 61.9 38.2 28.5 28.1 15.1 36.1 44.1 16.7 269 33.59 12 Zenith bank  47.0 61.0 15.7 29.8 28.0 24.8 24.9 22.7 254 31.74 15 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.    
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Table XII: Total loans and advances to total deposits (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total  Average Rank Access bank  24.9 42.0 35.1 32.5 31.8 27.6 43.6 49.2 286.7 35.84 5 Ecobank 16.0 39.1 25.3 19.2 34.1 57.0 51.2 29.4 271.3 33.91 7 Diamond bank  19.3 16.3 11.0 16.1 32.2 29.1 28.1 27.3 179.4 22.43 15 Fcmb bank 17.6 19.4 15.5 40.1 38.4 77.1 47.1 49.1 304.3 38.04 4 Fidelity bank 41.5 36.7 41.5 57.8 22.1 42.8 57.8 47.7 347.9 43.49 1 Firstbank 18.5 51.1 18.2 17.1 19.7 36.0 35.1 25.1 220.8 27.60 11 GTbank 13.7 23.4 19.0 53.6 26.6 28.9 31.2 58.2 254.6 31.83 10 Skye bank 37.8 41.4 48.5 33.0 43.2 27.5 54.3 48.3 334 41.75 2 Sterling bank 15.4 17.8 38.1 16.8 19.1 21.4 25.0 63.0 216.6 27.08 13 Stanbic bank  17.4 20.1 42.5 39.1 23.1 11.9 33.4 31.1 218.6 27.33 12 UBA bank  21.0 39.5 53.0 27.0 37.0 48.1 1`6.0 29.7 255.3 31.91 9 Union bank 37.1 28.8 41.1 53.7 17.3 49.0 52.0 33.0 312 39.00 3 Unity bank  47.3 17.1 45.6 14.1 10.0 19.1 17.0 10.2 180.4 22.55 14 Wema bank 15.0 28.0 50.0 21.5 19.7 68.1 20.2 41.1 263.6 32.95 8 Zenith bank  43.4 18.6 49.8 31.7 37.9 37.5 28.0 28.0 274.9 34.36 6 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  Table XIII: Total loans and advances to total deposits (post consolidation)  Bank  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank  Access bank  33.1 29.2 37.6 36.0 39.1 28.1 10.3 49.4 262.8 32.85 10 Ecobank 25.7 20.1 46.1 52.6 62.2 44.1 46.1 39.1 336 42 3 Diamond bank  52.1 35.1 18.1 19.6 17.0 38.3 21.4 29.0 230.6 28.82 12 Fcmb bank 18.7 50.3 19.3 54.1 10.4 19.7 22.2 17.5 212.2 26.52 15 Fidelity bank 56.6 57.8 57.9 59.9 39.8 60.4 34.2 27.4 394 49.25 1 Firstbank 47.1 29.1 42.1 43.1 16.8 46.1 44.1 31.1 299.5 37.43 5 GTbank 27.2 28.9 29.1 38.4 46.0 38.8 49.1 39.8 297.3 37.16 6 Skye bank 75.1 70.1 48.3 47.1 28.1 10.2 38.0 24.1 341 42.625 2 Sterling bank 67.0 67.0 21.1 31.1 26.1 19.5 24.0 47.0 302.8 37.85 4 Stanbic bank  47.3 56.8 38.0 21.1 13.1 24.1 10.7 49.0 260.1 32.51 11 UBA bank  29.5 69.2 29.6 32.8 31.0 27.4 20.9 52.7 293.1 36.63 7 Union bank 72.0 38.0 26.0 16.1 17.0 31.6 7.0 14.0 221.7 27.71 14 Unity bank  58.1 42.0 62.8 11.7 45.1 24.7 17.4 21.0  282.8 35.35 8 Wema bank 15.1 49.5 35.1 10.4 38.0 63.8 28.7 31.1 271.7 33.96 9 Zenith bank  28.3 57.1 11.0 46.8 29.7 23.1 15.0 14.8 225.8 28.22 13 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Management Efficiency Comparative analysis of the components of operating expenses during the pre-consolidation era shows that Fidelity Bank has a higher operating expenses and Ecobank having the lowest Operating expenses to total assets (pre consolidation) ratio while the post-consolidation also had GTBank with the highest operating expenses to total asset ratio and Zenith has the lowest Operating expenses to total asset ratio. 
The pre-consolidation operating expenses to total assets depicted a high figure for Fidelity Bank while Diamond Bank shows an average of 22.43% with Rank 15 while post consolidation Total loans and advances to total deposits (post consolidation) shows a high amount of 49.25 for Fidelity Bank and a low amount of 26.52 for FCMB and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively. 
Earnings Capacity (E) This study adopts net interest income to total asset as a measure of earning capacity of the fifteen (15) quoted commercial banks.   
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Table XIV: Net Interest Income to total assets (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total  Average Rank 
Access bank  17.8 13.8 29.0 24.3 16.9 30.4 16.2 22.6 171 21.38 15 Ecobank 16.8 15.0 37.5 30.5 29.7 20.3 30.2 25.0 205 25.63 14 Diamond bank  46.3 69.8 28.9 11.7 38.1 21.8 23.6 32.0 272.2 34.03 9 Fcmb bank 47.4 27.9 19.7 25.6 38.0 38.5 26.8 38.5 262.4 32.80 12 Fidelity bank 29.3 39.6 25.9 26.0 43.2 32.4 40.3 40.7 277.4 34.68 7 Firstbank 41.5 45.8 48.1 15.0 49.6 18.5 40.5 20.2 279.2 34.90 6 GTbank 22.7 27.8 29.2 34.7 47.1 43.7 38.9 39.5 283.6 35.45 5 Skye bank 33.1 25.9 18.0 43.5 31.5 35.7 46.3 38.1 272.1 34.01 10 Sterling bank 29.6 25.6 28.2 20.1 42.6 46.7 27.6 48.5 268.9 33.61 11 Stanbic bank  45.6 29.5 58.1 38.8 31.8 42.3 34.0 24.1 304.2 38.03 3 UBA bank  24.5 25.4 52.1 42.3 23.1 43.0 19.0 45,0 229.4 28.68 13 Union bank 30.6 36.4 43.0 40.8 29.1 25.5 28.2 42.6 276.2 34.53 8 Unity bank  25.4 42.1 45.6 46.2 48.5 58.1 48.7 29.5 344.1 43.01 1 Wema bank 38.8 43.0 42.2 30.4 54.6 43.1 44.3 38.9 335.3 41.91 2 Zenith bank  19.1 45.0 30.6 36.4 43.1 32.8 63.3 33.0 303.3 37.91 4 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.   Table XV: Net Interest Income to total assets (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank 
Access bank  54.4 41.5 50.3 37.8 49.0 61.7 26.7 39.6 361 45.13 2 Ecobank 42.7 37.4 15.8 50.5 55.6 25.8 33.4 46.3 307.5 38.44 11 Diamond bank  41.5 30.5 54.1 18.9 29.0 36.7 58.5 25.8 295 36.88 14 Fcmb bank 35.8 42.7 47.6 51.2 31.1 26.0 33.8 40.9 309.1 38.64 10 Fidelity bank 39.4 40. 30.5 28.4 55.0 50.4 45.3 28.1 317.1 39.64 9 Firstbank 23.4 28.3 43.8 22.6 35.5 36.5 26.1 47.0 263.2 32.90 15 GTbank 36.3 32.0 44.8 41.0 45.1 36.1 53.6 43.4 332.3 41.54 5 Skye bank 43.6 33.3 48.1 44.4 54.4 25.0 36.5 44.3 329.6 41.20 6 Sterling bank 29.1 30.4 33.7 40.8 45.8 29.4 54.4 42.1 305.7 38.21 12 Stanbic bank  27.6 37.1 40.6 42.3 45.5 42.9 43.5 49.2 328.7 41.09 7 UBA bank  24.7 43.3 46.4 31.5 46.3 29.8 59.6 42.0 323.6 40.45 8 Union bank 47.5 50.3 61.3 28.7 46.4 40.3 49.1 58.2 381.8 47.73 1 Unity bank  45.2 49.2 50.1 30.7 47.1 40.1 46.3 49.8 358.5 44.81 3 Wema bank 29.9 39.3 35.2 30.0 47.1 32.0 43.3 47.6 304.4 38.05 13 Zenith bank  33.6 40.4 53.6 27.4 53.0 34.7 48.6 42.9 334.2 41.78 4 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  
Earning Capacity Comparative analysis of the components of earning capacity during the pre-consolidation era shows that unity Bank has a higher net interest income to total assets (pre consolidation) and access bank having the net interest income ratio  
The pre-consolidation net interest income to total assets (pre consolidation) depicted a high figure for Unity Bank while Access Bank shows an average of 21.38% with Rank 15 while post consolidation net interest income to total assets (pre consolidation) shows a high amount of43.73 for Union Bank and a low amount of 32.90% for First Bank and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively. 
Liquidity (L) In this study, the ratio of total liquid asset to total asset is adopted. The tables below give insight of the liquidity in the pre and post consolidation. 
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Table XVI: Total Liquid Asset to Total Asset (Pre Consolidation) Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total  Average Rank 
Access bank  29.0 46.8 15.9 24.1 18.6 14.9 21.2 30.8 201.3 25.16 15 Ecobank 36.1 40.7 37.3 48.1 20.6 23.7 17.8 10.5 234.8 29.35 11 Diamond bank  18.0 29.9 16.10 28.8 67.6 47.8 46.2 36.0 290.4 36.30 2 Fcmb bank 21.6 68.9 65.6 20.1 45.8 16.8 41.3 40.4 320.5 40.06 1 Fidelity bank 19.7 14.1 17.8 24.0 51.7 23.7 16.0 38.4 205.4 25.68 13 Firstbank 22.4 22.1 58.6 24.7 34.0 27.5 51.6 17.1 258 32.25 8 GTbank 32.7 35.0 46.6 27.7 30.8 26.0 23.1 63.8 285.7 35.71 4 Skye bank 38.6 13.0 28.9 26.1 18.0 27.4 29.7 26.5 208.2 26.03 12 Sterling bank 25.0 35.0 36.3 30.3 49.7 28.6 30.1 32.2 267.2 33.40 6 Stanbic bank  24.0 10.9 39.8 28,0 37.8 34.0 29.3 25.6 201.4 25.18 14 UBA bank  51.S1 21.2 26.8 28.7 32.5 37.3 36.9 25.4 259.9 32.49 7 Union bank 26.9 18.1 62.0 27.5 30.0 46.6 37.8 24.9 273.8 34.23 5 Unity bank  28.4 35.3 27.4 27.5 30.6 27.0 33.8 25.1 235.1 29.39 10 Wema bank 29.7 13.5 8.0 29.1 55.0 28.8 38.1 40.8 243 30.38 9 Zenith bank  36.6 30.2 50.1 24.1 43.4 31.4 36.0 35.7 287.5 35.94 3 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks. Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.   Table XVII: Total Liquid Asset to Total Asset (post consolidation)  Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank 
Access bank  31.0 36.0 52.6 31.4 38.8 60.1 33.3 39.1 322.3 40.29 4 Ecobank 66.4 42.8 49.5 60.3 49.8 40.5 62.1 73.2 444.6 55.58 1 Diamond bank  58.0 40.2 62.7 40.8 41.3 28.0 32.2 38.3 341.5 42.69 3 Fcmb bank 43.7 40.0 56.4 39.4 47.3 69.1 36.0 55.7 387.6 48.45 2 Fidelity bank 43.0 47.5 40.1 27.7 39.3 25.0 35.3 37.0 294.9 36.86 7 Firstbank 41.5 39.1 43.8 18.0 48.0 12.1 38.0 35.9 276.4 34.55 9 GTbank 57.0 23.0 27.7 39.2 25.0 35.3 37.9 41.5 286.6 35.83 8 Skye bank 15.0 35.1 25.4 24.1 23.4 25.0 37.4 32.9 218.3 27.29 15 Sterling bank 38.6 43.2 19.4 18.0 38.1 69.4 38.0 37.3 302 37.75 6 Stanbic bank  15.1 23.4 15.1 28.5 57.5 37.9 37.6 30.8 245.9 30.74 13 UBA bank  30.6 43.0 28.3 23.7 37.0 39.8 37.6 30.8 270.8 33.86 10 Union bank 40.6 46.1 10.9 15.8 24.0 27.2 22.7 38.0 225.3 28.16 14 Unity bank  39.4 21.0 49.6 45.8 58.8 21.7 17.0 17.5 270.8 33.85 11 Wema bank 56.0 25.6 16.0 26.6 23.0 27.3 40.3 42.4 257.2 32.15 12 Zenith bank  20.8 57.6 15.8 24.7 28.9 42.1 40.9 28.0 322.3 40.27 5 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  
Liquidity Ratio Comparative analysis of the components of liquidity ratio during the pre-consolidation era shows that FCMB has a higher Total Liquid Asset to Total Asset (Pre Consolidation) and Access Bank having the lowest Total Liquid Asset to Total Asset ratio (Pre Consolidation) The post consolidation Total Liquid Asset to Total Asset (Post Consolidation) shows a high amount of 55.58% for Eco bank and a low amount of 27.29% for Sterling Bank and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively.  Sensitivity (S) This study adopts the ratio of net interest income to Gross Domestic Product     
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Table XVIII: Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (post consolidation Bank 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total  Average Rank Access bank  39.3 12.8 50.0 32.4 34.9 23.8 49.7 37.8 280.7 35.09 5 Ecobank 19.6 53.4 67.6 14.6 17.9 35.9 18.7 16.7 244.4 30.55 14 Diamond bank  18.4 33.0 44.7 33.7 27.8 40.5 34.7 15.8 248.6 31.08 13 Fcmb bank  40.0 34.9 50.1 33.4 46.9 37.9 17.6 260.8 32.60 12 Fidelity bank 23.9 23.0 47.6 48.7 11.2 50.8 40.2 34.8 280.2 35.03 6 Firstbank 19.0 18.8 47.0 66.1 44.7 39.7 50.1 46.8 332.2 41.53 1 GTbank 34.5 33.1 49.2 38.9 28.7 25.4 48.9 43.7 302.4 37.80 2 Skye bank 20.9 33.8 46.3 45.7 39.4 49.3 27.9 37.6 300.9 37.61 3 Sterling bank 13.7 22.5 44.7 39.7 50.0 49.0 38.7 37.2 295.5 36.94 4 Stanbic bank  21.7 17.6 16.6 49.7 48.6 38.7 19.7 12.5 225.1 28.14 15 UBA bank  14.8 16.9 45.4 37.9 41.7 27.6 39.9 45.5 269.7 33.71 9 Union bank 20.0 9.8 36.1 49.9 40.8 37.4 18.2 50.9 263.1 32.89 11 Unity bank  8.9 37.0 40.7 37.5 28.8 19.27 49.8 45.7 267.67 33.46 10 Wema bank 38.4 29.7 34.7 48.2 37.9 26.6 21.5 41.6 278.6 34.83 7 Zenith bank  43.0 40.6 24.9 22.9 39.74 30.8 50.7 24.5 277.14 34.64 8 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Table XIX: Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (pre consolidation)  Bank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total  Average Rank Access bank  30.4 26.6 27.9 16.5 30.4 15.6 23.3 26.4 280.7 35.09 5 Ecobank 12.6 11.1 16.7 24.5 12.6 20.6 24.9 30.5 244.4 30.55 14 Diamond bank  16.3 15.8 18.3 25.4 12.0 30.4 16.8 27.7 248.6 31.08 13 Fcmb bank 23.1 24.3 19.5 21.9 14.6 15.2 14.7 16.5 260.8 32.60 12 Fidelity bank 20.1 22.2 15.6 15.6 24.6 16.4 30.9 19.8 280.2 35.03 6 Firstbank 29.3 26.8 19.2 12.9 12.7 21.6 14.4 27.9 332.2 41.53 1 GTbank 10.8 17.6 16.9 30.5 12.9 12.4 30.2 13.6 302.4 37.80 2 Skye bank 16.7 30.5 24.6 24.5 23.9 13.5 13.3 16.8 300.9 37.61 3 Sterling bank 16.3 16.9 21.4 15.5 24.9 30.2 16.4 24.6 295.5 36.94 4 Stanbic bank  23.5 18.4 30.1 30.6 23.5 20.1 16.8 26.8 225.1 28.14 15 UBA bank  26.8 17.3 15.6 25.6 16.5 23.4 17.9 24.9 269.7 33.71 9 Union bank 10.1 17.8 13.2 15.5 20.6 16.6 22.2 24.7 263.1 32.89 11 Unity bank  10.0 30.0 24.2 14.6 21.3 13.0 26.3 30.6 267.67 33.46 10 Wema bank 30.5 29.8 25.6 14.7 30.6 16.8 17.8 16.6 278.6 34.83 7 Zenith bank  12.5 25.7 30.2 16.4 16.7 16.7 19.8 17.9 277.14 34.64 8 Source: Computed by Researcher from the financial statement of the quoted commercial banks.  Noted: The pre-consolidation data was computed from the balance sheet of all commercial banks merged to consolidate.  
Sensitivity to Market Risk Comparative analysis of the components of Sensitivity to market risk during the pre-consolidation era shows that First Bank has a higher Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (pre consolidation)  and Stanbic Bank having the lowest Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (pre consolidation)   The post-consolidation Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (post consolidation) depicted a high figure for First Bank  while Stanbic Bank shows an average of 28.14% with Rank 15 while post consolidation Net Interest Income to Gross Domestic Product (post consolidation) shows a high amount of 41.53 for First Bank and the Rank score is 1st and 15th respectively.  5. Discussion of Findings The objective of this study was to compare the CAMELS analysis of Nigerian pre and post consolidation of Nigerian commercial banks. This comparism is necessary to access the level of Nigerian banking system soundness between the pre and post consolidation reforms. In capital adequacy, Fidelity Bank is ranked the highest in Capital to Risk Asset Ratio in pre and post consolidation while UBA is ranked highest in Adjust 
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Capital to Risk Asset Ratio in pre consolidation and Stanbic ranked highest in post consolidation, this finding is expected due to the merging in the fidelity bank. In Asset Quality, Fidelity Bank is also ranked highest in pre and post consolidation using non performing loans to Total Asset while Union Bank is ranked highest in pre consolidation using loan to deposit ratio and Zenith bank ranked highest in post consolidation. In management quality fidelity bank is ranked highest in the pre consolidation using operating expenses to total asset while Guarantee Trust bank is ranked highest in post consolidation. In Earnings Capacity, Zenith bank is ranked highest in pre consolidation while union bank is ranked highest in post consolidation. In liquidity, First City Monument bank is ranked highest in pre consolidation while Eco bank is ranked highest in post consolidation. First bank is ranked highest in pre and post consolidation in sensitivity analysis.   Conclusion From the findings, the research draws the following conclusion: 1. There is significant difference in capital adequacy of the fifteen (15) quoted commercial banks in the pre and post consolidation reforms. This findings confirm the a-piriori expectation of the study and the objective of the consolidation reforms that raised bank capital from N2 billion to N 25 billion. 2. That there is significant difference between management quality of Nigerian commercial banks in the pre and post consolidated quality of Nigerian commercial banks in the pre and post consolidation reforms. 3. There is significant difference with the management quality of the pre and post consolidation Nigerian commercial banks. 4. That the Earnings capacity of Nigerian commercial banks in the post consolidation is better and greater than the pre consolidation. This finding confirms the expectation of the result and the objective of the banking sector reform. 5. Nigerian commercial banks are more liquid in the post consolidation than the pre consolidation.  6. Nigerian commercial banks are more sensive to shocks in the post consolidation than the pre consolidation. This findings is contrary to expectation, it might be traced to the multiplier effect of the global financial crises.  Recommendations The following are recommended from the findings of the study: 1. Policies should further be made to deepen the capital adequacy of the commercial banks to enhance capital adequacy of the quoted commercial banks in Nigeria. 2. The management and the regulatory authorities should ensure that the asset quality of the commercial banks is line with international standard. 3. Management should devise measures of managing the bank operating environment to enhance earnings capacity of the quoted commercial banks. 4. There is need to establish institution for risk management and investment appraisal of the commercial banks to avert the occurrence of poor asset quality. 5. The commercial banks should comply with the regulatory authorities on liquidity reserve to avoid overtrading and sensitivity to liquidity shocks. 6. There is need for efficient and effective management team in the banking industry to manage the environmental shocks that affect the performance of the Nigerian banking industry.  REFERENCES Alabede, J., (2012). The Intervening Effect of Global Financial Condition on the Determinants of Bank Performance: Evidence from Nigeria.  Accounting Journal of Finance and Management, 7(4), 489-528.  Al-Tamimi, H.A., (2010).Factors Influencing Performance of UAE Islamic and National Conventional Banks.Global Journal Business Research, 4  (2), 1-7.  Angadi, C., &Devraj, V.,  (1983). Profitability and Productivity of Banks in India.Economic and Political Weekly,  18,  26-42..  Barr, Richard et al. (2002). Evaluating the Productive Efficiency and Performance of U.S. Commercial Banks.Engineering Management,  28 (8) 19-28.  Bodla, B.S., &Verma, R ., (2006). Evaluating Performance of Banks through CAMEL Development.Chartered Financial Analyst.Evidence.Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 423-442.  Financial Standard Newspaper,4th January, 2006  
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